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COMBINATION PATENTS: THE RIGHT TO PROHIBIT
SALES OF REPLACEMENT PARTS*
THE scope of combination patents, long a source of confusion in patent law,
has again come before the Supreme Court,' furnishing the first opportunity to
assess the impact of two major upheavals in this area in recent years. Under
the patent act, a patentee is granted the exclusive right to make, use, or sell
his patented invention in the United States for seventeen years.2 A patent may
cover a combination of elements, unpatentable in themselves, which when
combined produce new and useful results.3 Technically, such a patent is in-
fringed only when the combination as a whole is made, used, or sold.4 Pre-
sumptively therefore, the patentee would have no right to control the sale of
an unpatented component used in the invention. Further, it might be argued
that control over component parts would result in a restraint upon competition
greater than that contemplated by the patent grant.5 Denial of such control,
however, may in some circumstances frustrate the policy of the patent laws by
substantially destroying the value of the patentee's monopoly. The unrestricted
sale of components to consumers would enable consumers to, in effect, recon-
struct wornout devices instead of turning to the patentee for a new machine.
The patentee would, of course, have a remedy against the purchaser for "mak-
ing" the patented device, but this remedy is largely theoretical. There are
generally so many consumers, each of whom has committed an economically
trifling infringement, that a suit to prevent sale of components may be the only
practical means of preventing unauthorized reconstruction. 6 Combination
*Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 270 F.2d 200 (1st Cir. 1959),
cert. granted, 362 U.S. 902 (1960).
1. Ibid.
2. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1958) ; see U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8. For requirements of patent-
ability, see 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03 (1958) ; Reviser's Note, 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1958) ; AMDUR,
PATENT FUNDAMENTALS 53-55 (1941); TOULMIN, HANDBOOK OF PATENTS 48-69 (2d ed.
1954) [hereinafter cited as TOULMIN].
3. There must be new and useful coaction between the several elements in a patent-
able combination. If one merely improves some element of a combination, a patent may be
secured for the new element but not for the entire combination even though it may give
improved results, because the elements are coacting in an "old" way. Bassick Mfg. Co. v.
Hollingshead Co., 298 U.S. 415 (1936). See generally TOULMIN, at 76-77; AMDUR, PATENT
FUNDAMENTALS 168-219 (1941). Compare 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 161, 171 (1958) (other
patents).
4. "[W]here a patent is for a combination merely, it is not infringed by one who uses
one or more of the parts, but not all, to produce the same results, either by themselves,
or by the aid of other devices." Wallace v. Holmes, 29 Fed. Cas. 74, 80 (No. 17100)
(C.C.D. Conn. 1871), citing Prouty v. Ruggles, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 336, 341 (1842).
5. Cf. Millner v. Schofield, 17 Fed. Cas. 392, 393 (No. 9609a) (C.C.W.D. Va. 1881).
6. See Roberts, Contributory Infringement of Patent Rights, 12 HARv. L. REv. 35,
39-40 (1898).
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patents have been construed, therefore, to give the patentee some control over
the sale of unpatented components.
The patentee's remedy against suppliers of component parts has been based
on the theory of "contributory infringement," a doctrine developed through
the application of general tort principles to the patent laws: if the use of the
item sold would result in the tort of direct infringement by the purchaser, the
supplier is treated as a joint tort-feasor. 7 This doctrine applied to the parts
maker who sold to an unauthorized manufacturer of new devices, as well as to
makers of replacement parts for reconstruction. Although the doctrine as origi-
nally expounded was applicable only if the supplier knew that the component
was to be used in the patented combination," such knowledge was presumed if
the element sold had no other significant use." More important was the require-
ment of a "direct infringement.""' Even if the component was made especially
for a patented device, the patentee must prove that its use by the consumer
would constitute making, using, or selling the device in violation of his patent
monopoly. To identify direct infringement in replacement sales cases, courts
originally looked to the contract, express or implied, between the patentee and
7. See, e.g., Rumford Chem. Works v. New York Baking Powder Co., 136 Fed. 873
(S.D.N.Y. 1905); Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., 80 Fed. 712 (6th Cir.
1897) ; Thomas, The Law of Contributory Infringement, 21 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 811, 817-
28 (1939) (citing cases).
RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 876 (1939) states that:
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, a person
is liable if he (a) orders or induces such conduct, knowing of the conditions under
which the act is done or intending the consequences which ensue, or (b) knows
that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance
or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself ....
(Emphasis added.) See Thomas-Houston Elec. Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., 80 Fed. 712, 721
(6th Cir. 1897) ; Matthews, Contributory Infringement and The Mercoid Case, 27 3. PAT.
OFF. Soc'y 260, 263-64 (1945).
The earliest use of the doctrine was in Wallace v. Holmes, 29 Fed. Cas. 74 (No. 17100)
(C.C.D. Conn. 1871) (selling burner for patented lamp combination). The modern term,
"contributory infringer," was not used until Snyder v. Bunnell, 29 Fed. 47 (S.D.N.Y.
1886).
8. If the article sold was capable of noninfringing uses, the plaintiff had the burden
of showing specific intent. Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., 80 Fed. 712,
723 (6th Cir. 1897). Mere proof of knowledge that the element was to be used in a par-
ticular device was sufficient to prove the requisite intent. E.g., Cutler-Hammer Mfg. Co.
v. Union Elec. Mfg. Co., 147 Fed. 266, 275 (E.D. Wis. 1906) ; Whitney v. New York
Scaffolding Co., 243 Fed. 180, 185 (8th Cir. 1917). Contra, Millner v. Schofield, 17 Fed.
Cas. 392 (No. 9609a) (C.C.W.D. Va. 1881).
9. Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., supra note 8, at 723; Wallace v.
Holmes, 29 Fed. Cas. 74, 80 (No. 17100) (C.C.D. Conn. 1871).
For the current status of the knowledge requirement, see note 40 infra.
10. Radio Corp. of America v. Andrea, 79 F.2d 626 (2d Cir. 1935); Bullock Elec. &
Mfg. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 129 Fed. 105 (6th Cir. 1904).
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the purchaser of his invention." If the machine was sold without restrictions,
the purchaser was assumed to have the right to make any repairs necessary to
his full use of the device.' 2 He had not, however, acquired a license to make
another machine. Thus, replacement of a component was held to constitute per-
missible "repair" when the machine's wearing or injury was "partial" 13 but
a direct infringement by "reconstruction" if the machine "as a whole... [was]
so much worn out as to be useless." 14 This somewhat intuitive distinction was
also verbalized by stating that replacements were permissible repairs so long
as the device did not lose its "original identity." 15
In the absence of express contractual limitations on the purchaser's right to
repair, courts attempted to establish criteria to distinguish between repair and
reconstruction. The perishability of the parts relative to "the machine as a
whole" was emphasized by the Supreme Court and many lower court decisions.
For example, the patentee was not allowed to prevent replacement of razor
blades in a safety razor, 6 needles in a hypodermic syringe,'7 or cutting blades
in a planing machine.' 8 In some cases, however, a part, such as the filament in
a light bulb, may be so important that, regardless of its perishability, it is sub-
stantially the whole device. Courts then applied the "vital element" test which
looks to the importance of the element with respect to the inventiveness it rep-
11. Heyer v. Duplicator Mfg. Co., 263 U.S. 100, 102 (1923) ("we have only to estab-
lish the construction of a bargain on principles of common sense"); Morgan Gardner
Elec. Co. v. Buettner & Shelburne Mach. Co., 203 Fed. 490, 493 (7th Cir. 1913).
12. Wilson v. Simpson, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 109, 122 (1850); F. F. Slocomb & Co. v.
A. C. Layman Mach. Co., 227 Fed. 94, 97 (D. Del. 1915) (right to make repairs "in
absence of a stipulation to the contrary").
Theoretically, the patentee could, if he wished, negative the presumed intent to permit
repair by an express contract provision prohibiting some or all replacements. Cf. Cotton-
Tie Co. v. Simmons, 106 U.S. 89 (1882). But cf. Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany Per-
forated Wrapping Paper Co., 152 U.S. 425 (1894).
The contract approach was also used to tie-in sales of unpatented supplies. See Henry
v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912); Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka
Specialty Co., 77 Fed. 288 (6th Cir. 1896). Dick was not overruled until Motion Picture
Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). See notes 22 and 23 infra.
13. Wilson v. Simpson, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 109, 122 (1850).
14. Id. at 124.
15. Goodyear Shoe Mach. Co. v. Jackson, 112 Fed. 146, 149 (1st Cir. 1901) ; Davis
Elec. Works v. Edison Elec. Light Co., 60 Fed. 276, 279-80 (ist Cir. 1894); Wilson v.
Simpson, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 109, 123 (1850). The purchaser who makes successive re-
placements, each of which would alone be permissible, until he has replaced virtually all
of the elements, does not necessarily infringe; replacements are not to be treated cumula-
tively. Davis Elec. Works v. Edison Elec. Light Co., supra (dictum); see Cinema Patents
Co. v. Craft Film Labs., Inc., 64 F.2d 42 (3d Cir. 1933); Brown, The Manufacture and
Sale of Unpatented Parts, 18 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 573, 596 (1936).
16. Gillette Safety Razor Co. v. Standard Safety Razor Co., 64 F.2d 6 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 290 U.S. 649 (1933) (replacement of worn out blade in razor).
17. Payne v. Dickinson, 109 F.2d 52 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 637 (1940).
18. Wilson v. Simpson, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 108, 125 (1850).
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resents, its operational effectiveness, and its structural predominance. 10 An
additional factor sometimes mentioned secondarily is the economic value of
the parts replaced relative to those remaining.
20
The contract approach, however, assumed that the patentee could, by ex-
press restrictions, limit the purchaser's right to make replacements which would
otherwise be permissible under the repair-reconstruction test.21 In effect, it
allowed the patentee effectively to define the limits of his statutory monopoly
by private contract. The contract approach was overruled, at least in part, in
1917 by the Supreme Court's decision in Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Uni-
versal Film MIfg. Co.22 The Court refused to enforce license provisions which
obligated the purchaser to use certain supplies which were not elements of the
patented combination. The Court held that supplies not mentioned in the patent
could not be monopolized by contract.23 The premise of this decision is that
the statute rather than contract defined the right of the parties. As applied to
replacement parts, the rationale of Motion Picture would have required courts
to define the statutory grant of protection in order to decide whether a con-
tractual restriction was within the grant of monopoly powers. Courts dealing
with replacement parts, however, continued to speak in terms of the "bargain"
between the parties, citing the older cases and applying the established repair-
reconstruction test.24 This would imply that the statutory right over component
parts is limitless, and that the contract defines how much control was actually
exerted by the patentee. In spite of their "bargain" language, however, courts
squarely facing the issue 25 have adopted the line drawn by the repair-recon-
struction test as a definition of the statutory grant of control over parts.20 But
19. Courts have not defined precisely what is meant by "vital." They seem, however,
to emphasize patentability and functional importance. See, e.g., Davis Elec. Works v. Edi-
son Elec. Light Co., 60 Fed. 276, 281-82 (1st Cir. 1894) (replacement of filament in light
bulb) ; Morrin v. Robert White Eng'r Works, 138 Fed. 68, 71-73 (E.D.N.Y. 1905) (re-
placement of tubes in steam generator consisting of a shell and tiers of generating tubes).
But see General Motors Corp. v. Preferred Elec. & Wire Corp., 79 F.2d 621, 623 (2d Cir.
1935) ("the gist or essence of the combination of mechanical elements lies in the com-
bination as a whole"). In Automotive Parts Co. v. Wisconsin Axle Co., 81 F.2d 125, 127
(6th Cir. 1935), the court rejects the above tests in favor of a structural one:
[I]f the new parts so dominate the structural substance of the whole as to justify
the conclusion that it has been made anew, there is a rebuilding or reconstruction;
and conversely, where the original parts, after replacement, are so large a part of
the whole structural substance as to preponderate over the new, there has not been
a reconstruction but only repair.
20. See, e.g., Heyer v. Duplicator Mfg. Co., 263 U.S. 100, 102 (1923).
21. See note 12 supra.
22. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917)
(plaintiff patentee's movie projectors sold with restriction that they were only to be used
with its films).
23. Id. at 517-18.
24. Heyer v. Duplicator Mfg. Co., 263 U.S. 100, 102 (1923).
25. Most cases do not face the issue because, in the absence of an express contract
provision prohibiting repair, the repair-replacement test applies regardless of its basis. The
choice arises only when the contract attempts to prohibit repairs not allowed by the test.
26. See Landis Machinery Co. v. Chaso Tool Co., 141 F.2d 800, 803 (6th Cir. 1944).
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even with the demise of the contract approach, the contributory infringement
doctrine still appeared to give combination patentees considerable control over
the sale of component parts.
27
In addition to denying enforcement, courts applying the new doctrine penal-
ized patentees who had attempted to expand their patent monopoly. Not only
would the court refuse to enforce the contract, but it would also refuse to pro-
tect the patentee against infringement. This was the doctrine of "misuse"-
the patent law equivalent of "unclean hands.128 Perhaps the most extreme ap-
plication of this doctrine is Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co.,29 in which
the patentee was found to have extended his patent monopoly illegally by re-
quiring licensees of its patented salt machine also to purchase its salt. The
patentee was denied relief against a third party who had clearly infringed the
patent by manufacturing and selling the entire salt machine without a license. 30
In Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 31 the Supreme Court's appli-
cation of the misuse doctrine made it clear that misuse constituted a substantial
if not total restriction on the use of the contributory infringement doctrine.
Mercoid seemed to expand the misuse doctrine by making it applicable to at-
tempts to monopolize the sale of any component. The patentee held a combina-
tion patent for a furnace stoker system, but neither the patentee nor his ex-
clusive licensee manufactured the entire unit. Instead, the licensee manufac-
tured one important component, a stoker switch, and conditioned the right to
make and install the stoker system upon purchase of its stoker switch. The
defendant also made stoker switches, whose only use was in the patentee's
stoker system. Since the purchasers of defendant's switches were not pur-
chasers of the patentee's switches, they were unauthorized to make or use the
stoker system; thus defendant's customers were guilty of direct infringement
See also Williams v. Hughes Tool Co., 186 F.2d 278, 287-91 (10th Cir. 1950) (Murrah,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
27. See generally, Wood, The Tangle of Mercoid Case Implications, 13 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 61 (1944).
23. See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942); 2 POMEROY,
EouITY JURISPRUDENCE § 397 (5th ed. 1941). The doctrine was established in Carbice
Corp. of America v. American Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931). See also Leitch
Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458 (1938); American Lecithin Co. v. Warfield Co.,
105 F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1939) ; B. B. Chem. Co. v. Ellis, .314 U.S. 495 (1942). These cases
deal with attempts to condition a license to use a patented process on the purchase from
the patentee of certain material used in its practice.
29. 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
30. The Morton case is perhaps an unreasonable extension of the "clean hands" doc-
trine. Generally, the doctrine is confined to misconduct "in regard to, or at all events con-
nected with, the matter in litigation, so that it has in some measure affected the equitable
relations subsisting between the two parties, and arising out of the transaction .... " 2
Po xEov, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 399 (5th ed. 1941).
For a case applying misuse to an attempt to monopolize "repair" sales, see Landis
Machine Co. v. Chaso Tool Co., 141 F.2d 800 (6th Cir. 1944).
31. 320 U.S. 661 (1944).
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whenever they installed a stoker system, and defendant's sales to them there-
by became contributory infringement. So the Supreme Court assumed argu-
endo. 32 When the patentee sued the defendant for contributory infringement,
however, relief was denied on the ground that the patentee's stoker switch-
license agreements constituted misuse. The Court reasoned that the patent con-
ferred only the right to monopolize the sale of the device as a unit, and that
the patentee was attempting by these license agreements to monopolize the
sale of stoker switches, an unpatented component. 33 The Mercoid rationale
indicates, however, that the "misuse" involved was not the restraint which the
licensing arrangement imposed on defendant, for the Court admitted that if
the patentee had not misused his patent, he would have been allowed to restrain
the defendant from selling components. 34 In other words, had the patentee or
his licensee been engaged in the sale of the whole combination, they could have
restrained defendant from manufacturing stoker switches. Rather, the Court's
reasoning seems to indicate that the evil of the license was the way it benefited
the patentee, giving him a monopoly over the sale of component parts instead
of a monopoly over the sale of the unit as a whole. "Misuse" was defined,
therefore, by looking to the nature of the reward which the patentee was at-
tempting to obtain from his patent.
The Mercoid definition of misuse is not clearly separable from an analysis
of the scope of the patent right itself. Traditionally, the patent right has been
defined negatively, as the right to prevent others from making, using or selling
a device. 35 What the patentee gains from this right, or whether he gains any-
thing, has not been considered crucial in determining whether someone else
has infringed the patent. This has been so despite the underlying purpose of
the patent right, which is to give the patentee some form of reward for his
inventiveness.36 The misuse doctrine, as explained in Mercoid, carries the idea
of a patent right to its logical conclusion by asking the question not asked by
the infringement doctrine-Is the reward being obtained by the patentee the
kind of reward which the patent laws intended him to enjoy? Thus, the "mis-
use" doctrine is not really separable from the doctrine of infringement, but is
merely a more discriminating application of the purposes underlying it.
The Mercoid decision, and particularly its dicta,37 caused considerable con-
32. Id. at 668.
33. Id. at 666-67.
34. Id. at 668.
35. See Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539, 548 (1852) ("The franchise
which the patent grants consists altogether in the right to exclude everyone from making,
using, or vending the thing patented, without the permission of the patentee.") ; McCor-
mick v. Talcott, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 402, 405 (1857).
36. For discussion of the need for and benefits derived from the patent system, see
Temporary National Economic Committee Hearings, pt. 3, at 837, 839-43, 857-59 (1939) ;
Yungblut, Dynamic Aspects of the Patent System, 28 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 18 (1946);
Ward, The United States Patent System, 35 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 789, 789-99 (1953).
37. Justice Douglas seemed to overrule Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking Mach.
Co., 213 U.S. 301 (1909), a classic contributory infringement case, saying:
[The case] is authority for the conclusion that he who sells an unpatented part of
a combination patent for use in the assembled machine may be guilty of contributory
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fusion, leading courts to wonder what if anything was left of the contributory
infringement doctrine.A8 In response to this uncertainty, Congress included
Section 271 in the 1952 Patent Act.39 This section gives statutory recognition
to the previous common law doctrine of contributory infringement, stating in
general the common law elements of that action. 40 Appropriately, the restric-
infringement. The protection which the Court in that case extended to the phono-
graph record, which was an unpatented part of the patented phonograph, is in sub-
stance inconsistent with the view which we have expressed in this case...
The result of this decision, together with those which have preceded it, is to
limit substantially the doctrine of contributory infringement. What residuum may
be left we need not stop to consider.
320 U.S. at 668-69.
38. Stroco Prods. Inc. v. Mullenbach, 67 U.S.P.Q. 168 (S.D. Cal. 1944); Landis
Mach. Co. v. Chase Tool Co., 141 F.2d 800, 801 (6th Cir. 1944) (dictum) ; Special Equip.
Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370 (1945) (dictum). Contra, Hall v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,
57 F. Supp. 430, 437-38 (N.D. W.Va. 1944) ; Jordan v. Hemphill Co., 180 F.2d 457, 461-
62 (4th Cir. 1950).
One writer postulates that the holding itself may outlaw contributory infringement
suits, see Wood, The Tangle of Mercoid Case Implications, 13 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 61,
71-73 (1944). But see Diggins, The Patent-Antitrust Problem, 53 Mica. L. REv. 1093,
1113 (1955). See generally Mathews, Contributory Infringement and The Mercoid Case,
27. J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 260 (1945).
39. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1958). See Hearings Before the House Committee on the .Tudi-
ciary, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 9, at 159 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Hearings, ser. 9],
(statement of Mr. Rogers, Congressman from Colorado) :
Then in effect this recodification . . . would point out to the court, at least that it
was the sense of Congress that we remove this question of confusion as to whether
contributory infringement existed at all, and state in positive law that there is such
a thing ....
See also H.R. REP. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1952); Rich, Infringement wnder
Section 271 of the Patent Act of 1952, 21 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 521, 534-36 (1953).
40. Before the 1952 Act, neither direct nor contributory infringement were defined
by statute. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (1958) reads, in full:
Whoever sells a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or
composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process,
constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially
made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a
staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial non-infringing use,
shall be liable as a contributory infringer.
The one modification in the common law doctrine is the treatment of sales of staple
articles. Under the statute, unlike the preexisting case law, see notes 7-9 supra and accom-
panying text, one can never be held liable for the sale of a staple.
The material part requirement, enacted to prevent patentees from transforming staple
articles into unique elements by non-functional alterations, Hearings, ser. 9, at 157, would
seem to require only that the component embody part of the novelty of the invention, id.
at 154.
The knowledge requirement is ambiguous. It has been construed not to require that the
defendant know that the intended use of the part constituted infringement, Freedman v.
Friedman, 242 F.2d 364 (4th Cir. 1957). Imposition of a more strict proof requirement
would represent an unintended departure from previous case law. See Thomson-Houston
Elec. Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., 80 Fed. 712, 723 (6th Cir. 1897) ; Hearings, ser. 9, at 164, 175.
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tive effect of Mercoid was not dealt with in the definition of infringement but
in a separate subsection concerned solely with misuse. Section 271 (d) pro-
vides
No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contribu-
tory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of
misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his having
done one or more of the following: (1) derived revenue from acts which
if performed by another without his consent would constitute contribu-
tory infringement of the patent; (2) licensed or authorized another to
perform acts which if performed without his consent would constitute
contributory infringement of the patent; (3) sought to enforce his patent
rights against infringement or contributory infringement.
Subsection (3) has been interpreted to mean only that a contributory infringe-
ment suit cannot, per se, be misuse.41 Subsections (1) and (2) deal with the
problem raised by the Mercoid case. Some commentators have argued' that
these subsections do not reverse the holding in Mercoid. Focusing on the fact
that the statute allows patentees to "derive revenue" from the sale of com-
ponent parts rather than saying forthrightly that patentees may control the
sale of components, the commentators suggest that the statute merely permits
a patentee to sell components competitively with other suppliers. 42 Thus if the
patentee does not wish to manufacture the whole device, he can only sell un-
restricted licenses to make the device and then offer components to his licen-
sees in competition with other component-makers. This analysis, however,
does not make sense when applied to subsection (2). The statute permits the
patentee to "license" or "authorize" others to do the same acts which he him-
self is permitted to do by subsection (1). If the only act permitted by sub-
section (1) is the sale of components in competition with unlicensed suppliers,
the "license" language is meaningless. Of what possible use is a "license" to
compete when anyone can compete without a license? In order to give signifi-
cance to the word "license," it must be assumed that the right of the patentee
being licensed is somehow exclusive-that another supplier could not sell the
component without the patentee's permission. If this is the case, both subsec-
tions must allow the patentee an exclusive right to sell components, precisely
the type of monopoly struck down by Mercoid. The legislative history tends
to support this conclusion; the Mercoid case was given by one draftsman as
the fact situation covered by subsection (2).43
41. Hearings Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.,
ser. 17, at 79 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Hearings, ser. 17].
42. See Note, 66 HARv. L. Ray. 909, 916-18 (1953); Comment, 55 MicH. L. Rav.
1151, 1157-61 (1957). But see Schramm, The Relationship of the Patent Act of 1952 to
the Antitrust Laws, 23 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 36, 61-62 (1954).
43. Hearings, ser. 17, at 67 (statement of Mr. Rich, a member of the patent bar and
one of the principal authors of § 271) :
The exception which we wish to make to the misuse doctrine would reverse the
result in the Mercoid case.
Hearings, ser. 9, at 174 (statements by Mr. Rich) ; see Hearings Before the House Con-
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In terms of the Mercoid misuse doctrine, what subsections (1) and (2) do
is to redefine and expand the rewards which a patentee can legitimately derive
from his combination patent. To the extent that some rewards may still not
be permitted, however, the misuse doctrine would still apply, and patentees
who seek monopolies outside the scope of this new grant would still be denied
relief. Closer examination of the statute is required, therefore, to determine
exactly what rewards beyond a monopoly over sales of the whole unit were
added by the 1952 Act.
The language of the statute permits the patentee to monopolize the sale of
a component if sale of that component by another would constitute infringe-
ment. There are two kinds of sales which can constitute infringement-sales
of a component to one who is making a new device, and sales of a replacement
part to the owner of a device for the purpose of "reconstruction.' '4 The
statute seems clearly intended to permit a monopoly over sales for the con-
struction of a new device, since this is the nature of the Mercoid monopoly
which the statute seeks to validate.45 Whether a monopoly over replacement
part sales is also permitted is less certain.
The issue of a replacement part monopoly was presented by the recent First
Circuit case of Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co.46 The
mittee on the Judiciary, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 21, at 17-18 (1948) (statement by Mr.
Kenyon, patent attorney).
One court has so interpreted the statute in dictum. Sola Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co.,
146 F. Supp. 625, 646-47 (N.D. Ill. 1956). For a discussion of other cases dealing incon-
clusively with this issue, see Comment, 3 VW.IL. L. Rzv. 355 (1958).
44. These are the two infringement situations established by the case law. See, e.g.,
Wallace v. Holmes, 29 Fed. Cas. 74 (No. 17100) (C.C.D. Conn. 1871); Davis Elec.
Works v. Edison Elec. Light Co., 60 Fed. 276 (1st Cir. 1894).
45. It might be argued that the patentee's licensing arrangement was also an attempt
to monopolize replacement sales. The patentee's advertisement that the "right to use" the
patented system was "only granted to the user" when its switches were purchased and
used in the system is ambiguous, 320 U.S. at 663. The lower courts found, however, that
royalties had never been received on anything but switches used in complete installation
of the unit, 133 F.2d at 811, indicating that only the more limited monopoly was being
sought.
But in either case it is probable that the "Mercoid situation" which the drafters of the
1952 Act had in mind and intended to legalize was the monopolization of components for
use in new units. This seems the case for two reasons. First, the replacement monopoly
issue does not seem to have arisen in Mercoid; because the defendant did not argue that
any of its sales were for permissible repair, the patentee's practice with respect to such
sales was not directly relevant and does not seem to have been noticed or taken into ac-
count. There is one reference in the Circuit Court's opinion to the possibility that some
of defendant's sales might be for repair and replacement, but the court dismisses these as
non-infringing, 133 F.2d at 808-09. Compare the explicit attempt to monopolize both orig-
inal and replacement sale of parts in Landis Mach. Co. v. Chaso Tool Co., 141 F.2d 800
(6th Cir. 1944). Also, the legislative history indicates, if only by negative inference, that
the drafters were not consciously concerned with replacement sales. They are mentioned
only a few times in the Hearings, incidentally and not in reference to misuse, Hearings,
ser. 17, at 46, 69; Hearings, ser. 9, at 153.
46. 270 F.2d 200 (1st Cir. 1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 902 (1960).
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patented combination in question was a convertible top unit with certain auto-
matic features which made it possible for the car owner to raise and lower
the top without getting out of the car. The patentee and its licensees manu-
factured the entire unit for installation on new automobiles. They also made
and sold replacements for the original fabric portion of the top, which nor-
mally wore out long before the other mechanical elements. The defendant,
Aro, also manufactured the fabric portion, which was specially designed to fit
the other features of the patentee's unit. Defendant's fabric part was adver-
tised and sold as a replacement for the original. The court of appeals affirmed
the district court's finding that defendant's sales constituted contributory in-
fringement; it used the old common law contributory infringement cases to
interpret section 271(c), concluding that replacement of the fabric part was
"reconstruction" rather than "repair. ' 47 Certiorari has been granted by the
Supreme Court.
48
The Circuit Court did not discuss the issue of whether the 1952 statute per-
mits patentees to monopolize the sale of replacement parts, but the finding for
the plaintiff implicitly assumes that it does. The language of the statute would
support this view, for it allows the patentee to monopolize any sale which, if
made by another, would constitute infringement, and does not qualify the
word "infringement." 49 Apparently, no distinction is made between the two
kinds of infringing sales. On the other hand, since patent monopolies are an
exception to the public policy against monopolies and restraint of competition,
they have, in recent years, been construed narrowly. Justice Jackson's opinion
in Mercoid illustrates the attitude toward combination patents:
I think we should protect the patent owner in the enjoyment of just what
he has been granted-an abstract right in an abstruse combination-worth
whatever such a totality may be worth. I see no constitutional or statu-
tory authority for giving it additional value by bringing into its monopoly
all or any of the unpatentable parts.5 °
Although Mercoid's definition of the patent monopoly has been rejected by
Congress, the rule of strict construction would still be applicable to the new
definition under the 1952 act. Strictly construed, the monopoly grant of section
271 (d) may not include replacement parts. If the traditional reconstruction
test is applied to replacement sales to determine whether a patentee can mo-
nopolize such sales, the reward derived by the patentee may be significantly
greater than the reward derived from a Mercoid-type monopoly over parts
used for initial construction of whole units. In Mercoid, the patentee could
have exercised its right to monopolize the sale of whole units (which would
47. 270 F.2d at 203-05. The statute itself adds little to the common law test of "in-
fringement," except for the staple goods-material part limitation. See note 40 supra.
48. 362 U.S. 902 (1960).
49. See text at note 41 supra.
50. 320 U.S. 661, 680 (1944) (dissenting on other grounds) ; cf. United States v. Univis
Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942) (right to control resale price).
[Vol. 70:649
COMBINATION PATENTS
have included, of course, a monopoly over stoker switches) ; it chose instead
to monopolize only stoker switches. Arguably, the patentee restrained competi-
tion less than it could have. If the patentee were limited to this kind of reward
from a replacement parts monopoly, he could only obtain a monopoly when
there is a market for his invention, the entire unit. This situation will occur
only when the consumer is willing to buy a whole unit if the part in question
wears out-for example, the sale of a filament for a burned out light bulb in
place of the sale of a new bulb. But the "reconstruction" test would probably
not limit the replacement parts monopoly to this extent. The finding of recon-
struction in Aro is an example, for it is doubtful that a consumer would buy
an entire convertible top mechanism every time the fabric wore out-no one
would buy a top under those conditions. 5' Even if Aro misapplied the tradi-
tional "new-machine" test,5 2 this test itself and the common criteria used in
applying it, such as "degree of inventiveness," "structural dominance," and
"'operational effectiveness" do not directly relate to the existence of a demand
for the whole unit. The criteria of "relative perishability" and "relative cost,"
while more relevant to the existence of such demand, seem to have been out-
weighed, at least in emphasis, by those criteria more oriented toward defend-
ing the essential inventiveness of the combination.5 3
The legislative history of section 271 indicates that Congress was not aware
of the possibility that the present reconstruction doctrine might grant mo-
nopoly rights exceeding those sought in Mercoid. Mercoid was consistently
pointed to as an example of the misuse doctrine and its unduly restrictive
effect; replacement parts were mentioned but once in the hearings, and then
not in connection with the misuse doctrine.5" It may be possible to conclude,
therefore, that Congress was concerned only with the somewhat anomalous
result in Mercoid. Thus section 271, viewed as a redefinition of the rewards
a patentee may claim, might be construed not to apply to monopolies over the
sale of replacement parts, despite its broad wording.
If this interpretation is accepted, it would appear that the Mercoid misuse
doctrine still applies to attempts to monopolize replacement parts. But this
approach would be unsatisfactory. First, since Mercoid prohibits all replace-
ment parts monopolies,5 5 it would disallow those few monopolies in which the
sale of the part might be said to be a substitute for the possible sale of the
whole device. Thus the misuse doctrine might impinge on the statutory policy
allowing monopolies over component parts sold in lieu of new units. The en-
joyment of valid monopolies might also be restricted by the sometimes indis-
51. See 270 F.2d at 205.
52. The court articulated the distinction as the difference between "minor repair"
and "major reconstruction." It found the fabric part not perishable, although it had a life
of about three years in relation to the life of the mechanism, which was probably the life
of the car. Ibid.
53. See generally notes 18-20 supra and accompanying text.
54. See Hearings, ser. 9, at 153.
55. See text at note 34 supra.
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criminate sweep of the misuse doctrine. In at least one case it has been held
to wipe out all patent protection once an invalid monopoly is attempted."*
A better way to effectuate the statutory policy would be to redefine the
reconstruction test to make it comport with the idea of permissible reward
which may be culled from the interaction of Mercoid and the statute. The sale
of a replacement part could be found infringing only when the patentee could
reasonably have made the sale of a whole unit if no parts were available. The
result in some of the reconstruction cases would fit this test. In one, the in-
fringer was replacing filaments in burned out light bulbs, certainly a case
where the sale of a new light bulb was natural. 57 In another, a patented
machine-and-supporting-legs combination was found "reconstructed" by the
replacement of the machine alone. 58 Making the change in this manner would
enable courts to give section 271 as broad an application as its language seems
to call for. Sales monopolies on both new and replacement parts could be per-
mitted, but the latter only when the sale of the part meets the strictly limited
"reconstruction" test. The existence of a demand for an entire new unit would
require evidence that the price of the whole unit would be considered reason-
able by consumers even though the useable life of the whole unit were equal to
the life of the part in question. This test seems easiest to apply when the paten-
tee manufactures original units. If he manufactures only original units, he may
be able to show sales evidence of purchases when repair parts are not available.
If, however, he manufactures both original units and replacement parts, the
contrary inference can be drawn, 59 although it would be left open to the plain-
tiff to show some reason for selling parts rather than new units. In the case
where the patentee does not make the whole unit, the characterization of the
disputed part will be more difficult. The criteria of relative perishability and
cost, now sometimes mentioned in reconstruction cases, would seem most ap-
propriate for this determination.
56. Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942), discussed in text at
note 29 supra.
57. Davis Elec. Works v. Edison Elec. Light Co., 60 Fed. 276 (lst Cir. 1894).
58. Pacific Steam Whaling Co. v. Alaska Packers' Ass'n, 100 Fed. 462 (9th Cir. 1900).
See also Cotton Tie Co. v. Simmons, 106 U.S. 89 (1882).
59. The inference would be based on the presumption that a patentee would not be
selling replacement parts only, if there were a true market for the whole unit.
